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The paper provides a quantitative assessment of the possible market  implications of the December 
2006 reform of the EU domestic policy regime for bananas. It is shown that, depending on 
implementation choices to be made at the member country level, the impact of the domestic policy 
reform on trade can be of a larger order of magnitude than that of the controversial  “tariff-only” 
regime the EU introduced earlier in the same year. The simulations presented in this paper show 
that, ceteris paribus, if France, Portugal and Spain decide to decouple payments to their banana 
producers EU imports will increase by 13% and MFN exports to the EU by 16%; if they decide for 
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The European Union (EU), with more than 30% of total imports in 2005, is the largest world 
importer of bananas, (the US is the second) and the 18
th largest producer. Banana production in the 
EU is concentrated in the French Overseas Departments (Martinique and Guadeloupe) and Spain 
(Canary Islands), but production also takes place in Portugal (Madeira, Azores and in the 
continental area), Greece (Crete) and Cyprus. Domestic production is around one sixth of domestic 
consumption, with imports from MFN and preferred African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries accounting for two thirds and one sixth of the EU market, respectively. Bananas account 
for an important share of export revenue in all major exporting countries; it is close to 20 per cent in 
Ecuador and around 10 per cent in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. 
On 1 January 2006 the EU introduced a new import regime for bananas, removing the quota 
for imports under MFN conditions, setting the MFN tariff equal to 176 €/t and expanding the duty-
free quota reserved for imports from ACP countries from 750,000 to 775,000 t.  In addition, from 1 
January 2006 the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, which allows least developed country 
exports quota- and duty-free access to the EU market, has been fully implemented for bananas. 
In December 2006 the EU approved a reform of its domestic policies for bananas. The 
previous Common Market Organization (CMO) regime for bananas provided generous and fully 
coupled support to domestic producers through a “deficiency payment” scheme; the per unit aid was 
given by the difference between a reference price, which did not change over time, and the observed 
domestic price. The reform cancelled the CMO for bananas. For banana producing areas outside the 
“outermost regions” (Greece, Cyprus and continental Portugal) support  (4.6 million €) has been 
fully decoupled and included in the “Single Farm Payment” (SFP) introduced by the June 2003 
Fischler reform of the CAP.  For the “outermost regions” (France, Spain, Azores and Madeira) 
financial resources of a similar order of magnitude to those previously absorbed by deficiency 
payments (278.8 million €) have been added to the budget allocation of the POSEI programmes; 
  2these programmes finance the use of a wide range of policy instruments, whose aim is to increase 
the competitiveness of agricultural production in these “disadvantaged” regions. The decision on 
which ones to implement is left to the individual member country. Feasible actions under the 
POSEI programmes will now include direct payments to banana producers. 
The goal of the paper is to provide a quantitative assessment of the possible impact on trade of 
this radical change in the EU domestic policy regime for bananas. The next section presents the 
structure of the model, the data used and the assumptions made. In section two the results of the 
simulations performed are presented. Section three contains an assessment of the sensitivity of the 
results obtained to the assumptions made with respect to some of the exogenous parameters used in 
the model, and section four concludes.  
1. The model 
The model used is a revised and expanded version of the one used in Anania (2006). It differs in 
two ways: the five EU banana producing member states are modelled individually and the 
representation of the domestic policy instruments in the EU is more detailed. 
The model used is a single commodity, spatial, partial equilibrium, mathematical 
programming model (Takayama and Judge 1971), which considers five sources of domestic supply 
within the EU, fourteen exporting and eight importing countries/regions (table 1). EU domestic 
production takes place in France (Martinique and Guadalupe), Spain (Canary islands), Portugal 
(Madeira and Azores),
1 Greece (Crete) and Cyprus.  
Import demand and export supply functions, as well as domestic supply functions in the EU, 
are assumed to be linear, or to be well approximated by linear functions in the portion relevant for 
the simulations conducted. Import demand and export supply functions in the base year are obtained 
from observed imported and exported quantities, observed import and export prices, and import 
demand and export supply price elasticities at the equilibrium in each country/region (table 1); 
analogously, supply functions in the EU are obtained from observed produced quantities and 
                                                 
1 Banana production in continental Portugal is negligible and has been ignored. 
  3relevant prices, and supply elasticities. The values of the elasticities used are exogenously 
determined; they are based on those used in other studies (Arias et al. 2005; Guyomard, Laroche 
and Le Mouël 1999; Kersten 1995; Spreen et al. 2004; Vanzetti et al. 2005). Sensitivity analyses 
with respect to some of the values of the elasticities used have been performed and the results 
obtained have proved to be robust.
2 The sources for the data in the model are the FAOSTAT and 
COMTRADE databases, the World Bank and the European Commission (Anania 2006).   
The base model time reference is 2002. The representation of the EU-15 import regime in 
2002 includes:  
(a) quota A/B: a 2,653,300 t import quota, with all imports occurring on a non-preferential basis 
subject to a 75 €/t tariff (ACP exports can enter quota A/B duty-free);  
(b) quota C: a 750,000 t quota allocated to duty-free imports from ACP countries only; 
(c) an out-of-quota MFN import tariff of 680 €/t (380 €/t for imports from ACP countries).  
The 2002 base model calibration appears satisfactory (table 1). The simple average percentage 
difference, in absolute value, between observed and predicted exports in 2002 is 5.3%; the 
analogous value for imports is 4.8%. If the exports- and imports-weighted average per cent 
differences, in absolute value, are considered instead, the average differences drop to 2.7% and 
2.6%, respectively. 
  In the 2002 base model solution both EU-15 Tariff Rate Quotas - quotas A/B and C - are 
binding; ACP exports to the EU-15 equal the C quota (750,000 t) and those by non-ACP countries 
equal the A/B quota (2,653,000 t).  
Simulations for all policy scenarios considered have been generated with reference to 2013, 
when the reform of the CMO is to be fully implemented in all countries
3 and it is possible to assess 
the market effects of the adjustments in production decisions as a result of the changes in both the 
EU import and domestic policy regimes.   
  The 2002 base model has been “extended” to 2013:  
                                                 
2 The results of the sensitivity analyses are presented in section 3. 
3  In Cyprus the full implementation of the reform will take place in 2013. 
  4(a)  by modelling the 2004 enlargement of the EU-15 to the 10 new member states;
4  
(b)  by modelling the introduction on 1 January 2006 of the EU tariff-only import regime;  
(c)  by modelling the implementation of the EBA initiative;  
(d)  by modelling the changes in import demand and export supply functions in all 
countries/regions resulting from expected shifts in domestic demand and supply functions; 
and  
(e)  by assuming a €/$ exchange rate equal to 1.25.
5   
The 2004 EU enlargement has been modelled by removing barriers to trade between the 10 
new member states and the EU-15 and by extending to them the import regime in place in the EU-
15.  
MFN imports are subject to a 176 €/t tariff only (they are not subject to any quantitative 
limitation); ACP countries are granted preferential duty-free access within a 775,000 t TRQ (out-of-
quota ACP exports to the EU are subject to the 176 €/t MFN tariff). 
Banana exports from EBA countries are assumed to enter the EU tariff-free and are not 
subject to any quantitative limitation. 
Import demand and export supply functions shift according to expected changes, ceteris 
paribus, in the quantities produced and consumed in each country/region.
6 Consumption has been 
assumed to vary over time based on the per cent yearly change in population between 1990 and 
2003, and the per cent yearly change in per capita income between 1997-1999 and 2000-2002 (in 
both cases the data source is the World Bank); the values used for domestic demand income 
elasticities are provided in table 1. Production in each country/region is assumed to change over 
time in line with the observed per cent yearly change in banana yields
7 between 1991-1993 and 
                                                 
4 The 2007 enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania has been ignored in this exercise.  
5 The exchange rate in 2002 was 0.9456. For the new member states it has been assumed that the exchange rates 
between their currencies and the US dollar change with the €/$ exchange rate (i.e. their exchange rates with respect to 
the euro remain constant).  
6 FAOSTAT is the source used for production and consumption in 2002. 
7 The source is FAOSTAT. 
  52000-2002.
8  
With respect to the developments in the WTO Doha Development Agenda round of 
negotiations, it is assumed that no agreement is reached.   
2.  The Reform of the EU Common Market Organization for Bananas 
Because of the nature of the POSEI programmes, the reform gives ample flexibility to Spain, 
France and Portugal in the use of the conspicuous resources which have been added to those 
available under these schemes (EC 2006). At this point in time, it is impossible to make 
assumptions on the specific measures financed by Spain, France and Portugal with the resources 
transferred into their POSEI programmes; this means that an a priori assessment of the impact of 
the December 2006 reform of the CMO for bananas is impossible. What can be done instead is to 
simulate the expected market impact of different scenarios, assessing what may happen depending 
on the policy decisions countries make. Three alternative policy choices by France, Portugal and 
Spain all feasible within the POSEI framework, are considered (all scenarios assume full 
decoupling of support in Greece and Cyprus):  
(a)  a “Status quo” scenario, in which France, Portugal and Spain use all financial resources to 
provide banana producers in their “outermost regions” with fully coupled support analogous 
to that which they enjoyed under the previous policy regime;  
(b)  a “Full  decoupling” scenario, in which all financial resources are used to provide banana 
producers with direct payments fully decoupled from production; and  
(c)  a “Memorandum” scenario, based on a joint proposal put forward in September 2005 by 
Cyprus, France, Portugal and Spain:  
                                                 
8 Some of the parameters governing these shifts have been judged to be unsustainable over time; in particular, this was 
the case for (a) negative and (b) very high rates of change in yields, and (c) for extreme (both, positive and negative) 
rates of change in per capita incomes. As a result, per cent yearly yield changes above 5% have been replaced by 5%, 
and below 0% by 0%; per cent yearly per capita income changes above 7% have been replaced by 7%, and below -3% 
by -3% (table 2). The use of the observed per cent changes in population and per capita income for the EBA countries, 
both ACP and non-ACP ones, would have had a marked negative effect on their export supply over time, leading to 
decreased or no exports. In order to make these countries more responsive to the structural change associated with the 
implementation of the EBA initiative than could be predicted on past performance, the rates of change of both variables 
for ACP and non-ACP EBA exporters have been set equal 0.  
  6(i)   in France and Spain 60% of financial resources are devoted to decoupled 
payments, but in order to receive them producers are required to produce at least 
70% of what they produced, on average, in the 2000-2004 period; the remaining 
40% is devoted to other policy interventions, some of these possibly extending 
beyond the boundaries of the banana sector;  
(ii)  in Madeira and Azores all financial resources are devoted to a fixed (rather than 
variable, as in the “deficiency payment” scheme in place in the pre-2007 regime) 
fully coupled production subsidy.    
A scenario with no policy change whatsoever with respect to the pre-2007 policies is 
simulated to generate a reference for the assessment of the impact of the three policy choices 
considered. 
“No policy change” 
In this scenario no change in the domestic aspects of the CMO for bananas takes place; only 
changes in market access conditions and expected developments in demand and supply functions 
between 2002 and 2013 are simulated.  
The EU “basic” (or “compensation”) aid for banana producers is modelled as a fully coupled 
deficiency payment. The per unit payment is calculated as the difference between the given 
reference price (which does not change over time) and the domestic market price. As long as the 
domestic market price remains below the reference price, the relevant domestic producer price in 
the EU (market price + per unit “basic” aid) does not change. As a result, domestic production does 
not adjust to changes in the EU domestic market (consumer) price; what does change with the latter 
is the per unit “basic” aid paid to producers and the budgetary cost of the CMO.  
The “supplementary aid” is paid only in those countries where the price is lower than the 
average EU price by more than 10%.
9  In the model both “basic” and “supplementary” direct 
                                                 
9 Supplementary aid payments in the 2000-2005 period were between 1.7 million € in 2001 and 43.1 in 2005. 
  7payments are subject to the “stabilization” mechanism which was part of the pre-2007 CMO.
10 
Production decisions are assumed not to react to cuts in “basic” aid in the previous year, if any, as a 
result of domestic production exceeding the maximum guaranteed volume on which payments are 
made. This is because farmers are assumed to act as rational “free riders”, i.e. they believe that the 
other farmers will reduce their production expecting the same cut to apply in the following year 
(hence, there is no reason for them to do so, because, if the others reduce production, there will be 
no reduction in aid).  
Payments are assumed not to be subject to reductions as a result of the “budget discipline” 
constraint. “Modulation” does not apply to payments to producers in “outermost regions”, which 
account for about 98% of EU domestic production of bananas, and has been ignored in the 
simulations. 
In September 2002 negotiations started to replace by 2008 the Cotonou agreement between 
the EU and ACP countries with a set of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between the EU 
and six regional aggregations of the ACP countries, with preferences extending to all trade and 
becoming reciprocal, essentially creating free trade areas between the EU and each of the six sets of 
countries; this would mean allowing ACP countries to export bananas to the EU quota- and duty-
free. In this reference scenario EPA are assumed not to have been implemented by 2013.  
Under a continuation of the policies in place in 2006, banana consumption in the EU-25 in 
2013 is expected to reach 6 million t and domestic production and imports to be 1,034 and 4,976 
thousand t, respectively (table 3). Even if the relevant farm price (market price + deficiency 
payment) does not change, domestic production will increase over time because of increasing yields 
in Cyprus, France and Spain (table 2) and exceed the 854,000 t threshold which “triggers” the 
financial stabilizer mechanism (cuts in aid payments to be applied in Cyprus, France and Spain).  
                                                 
10 If total domestic banana production exceeds the sum of the maximum guaranteed volumes in each of the producing 
countries (867,500 t), then a cut in the volume of bananas on which the payments are made is applied in the countries 
where production has exceeded the maximum guaranteed volume; this cut is adjusted by redistributing pro rata among 
the countries where the cuts apply the difference between maximum guaranteed volume and production in those 
countries where, on the contrary, this difference is greater than zero. 
  8Imports from ACP countries equal the duty-free 775,000 t quota; those from MFN countries 
equal 4.103 million t, those from EBA countries 98,000 t.  
Increased imports – driven by the increased competitiveness of MFN exports on the EU 
market as a result of the new import regime in place since 1 January 2006 – are responsible for most 
of the forecasted reduction in market prices, and, as a result, of the increase in the per unit “basic” 
aid, which in the 2002 was equal to 303.3 €/t and is simulated to reach 419.8 €/t in 2013.
11 Total EU 
budget expenditure (i.e. the budget expenditure for both “basic” and “supplementary” aid payments) 
equals 373.3 million €, well above CMO budget costs observed in the past.
12  
Tariff revenue, on the contrary, is now much higher than under the pre-2006 import regime, 
when imports from MFN countries were subject to a binding quota and a lower tariff (75 €/t) was 
imposed; it increases from less than 200 million € before 1 January 2006 to 722.1 . 
 “Status quo” 
In this scenario no change in the domestic aspects of the CMO for bananas takes place in France, 
Portugal and Spain, while support is fully decoupled in Greece and Cyprus.  
The “supplementary” aid is eliminated, and France, Portugal and Spain use all financial 
resources for the “basic” aid. The per unit payment to banana producers is calculated as the 
difference between the given reference price (unchanged with respect to the previous regime) and 
the domestic market price. Farms in Greece and Cyprus are assumed to satisfy cross-compliance 
conditions at no extra cost. 
The financial stabilizer mechanism is now assumed to guarantee that  budget expenditure does 
not exceed the financial resources which the 2006 reform added to the budget of each country’s 
POSEI programme (129.1 million € in France, 8.6 in Portugal and 141.1 in Spain). If expected 
expenditure in one of the three countries exceeds the financial allocation, then the per unit “basic” 
aid is reduced in order to make total subsidy expenditure equal the financial allocation. Again, 
production decisions are assumed to be independent of the financial stabilization mechanism.  
                                                 
11 In the 2000-2005 period the per unit “basic aid” varied between 382.9 €/t in 2000 and 59 €/t in 2005. 
12 In the 1994-2005 period it exceeded 300 million € only in 2000 when it was equal to 301.9 million €.  
  9If France, Portugal and Spain decide not to change the policy support granted to their banana 
producers in their “outermost regions”, the reform of the CMO for bananas will bring very little 
change (table 3; figure 1). The main impact will be through the reduction in banana production in 
Cyprus and Greece as a result of the decoupling of support. However, because of the small amount 
of bananas being produced in these two countries with respect to that produced in the Canary 
Islands, Guadalupe, Martinique, Madeira and the Azores, this change will have a very small market 
impact. If in 2013 the Economic Partnership Agreements are not implemented, then EU domestic 
price will increase and consumption decline marginally. The small increase in imports (26 thousand 
t) comes almost entirely from MFN countries (ACP exports are constrained by the TRQ and EBA 
exports increase by a negligible amount). The most significant change is in EU budget expenditure, 
which is now equal to the amount decided with the reform (283.4 million €) while it is forecasted to 
increase to 373.3 million € if there is no reform of the policy regime. 
If EPA are implemented by 2013 (and banana trade is not excluded from the free trade areas 
which will be created), then ACP exports will enter the EU market duty- and quota-free, as those 
from EBA countries already do, and will displace part of MFN and EBA exports in the EU market. 
The impact of the implementation of EPA on the EU market simulated by the model is minimal, 
while its effects on trade are significant. In fact, when ACP bananas are assumed to enter the EU 
duty-free and without any quantitative restriction, EU production remains unaffected (in France, 
Portugal and Spain production depends on the domestic policy regime only) and imports increase 
only marginally, but MFN exports decline by 144,000 t
13 and ACP exports increase by 152,000 t . 
EU tariff revenue declines with respect to the scenario in which the EPA are not implemented as a 
result of the lower imports from MFN suppliers. 
“Full decoupling” 
Under this scenario in all countries both “basic” and “supplementary” aid payments in the pre-2006 
policy regime are removed and replaced by direct payments to farms fully “decoupled” from the 
                                                 
13 EBA exports decline as well, by 800 t. 
  10quantity of bananas produced, analogously to those introduced in other sectors with the Fischler 
reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy.
14
The costs of maintaining uncultivated land in good agronomic conditions or of satisfying 
“cross-compliance” requirements are assumed to be negligible. 
Everything else held constant, the decoupling of support is expected to induce a sharp 
reduction in banana production in the EU, while the impact on farm incomes may be either  positive 
or negative. This is so because, on the one hand, decoupled payments now equal 283.4 million €, 
well below those farmers would have received under the previous regime (373.3 million €), but, on 
the other hand, they now produce only what is profitable at market prices (in the “No policy 
change” scenario domestically produced bananas are sold on the market at a price below the 
marginal cost of production).  
In this scenario, if EPA are assumed not to be implemented, EU production is forecasted to 
equal in 2013 351 thousand t (in the same year under the “Status quo” option it is forecasted to 
exceed one million t) (table 3).  EU banana consumption is only slightly below the level under the 
reference scenario and the “Status quo” option, as domestic price increases by one per cent only. 
Increased imports (+ 650 thousand t, +13.1% with respect to the “No policy change” reference 
scenario) replace in EU consumption the marked reduction in domestic banana production. The 
small increase in the EU market price drives up prices worldwide and US imports and “Rest of the 
world” net imports decline by 1.3% and 1.9%, respectively. If it is assumed the EPA are not  
implemented, the benefits from the reform of the EU domestic policy regime for bananas for  
exporters are limited to MFN and EBA countries; ACP exports are still competitive on the EU 
market only and remain constrained by the duty-free TRQ (the quota rent increases with respect to 
the “No policy change” scenario from 47.5 $/t to 56 $/t). MFN exports are now 4.749 million t
15 , 
646,000 t above the level forecasted when no policy change is assumed (table 3; figure 1). 
                                                 
14 The June 2003 reform of the CAP decoupled support for arable crops, dairy products and meats; later direct payments 
for olive oil, tobacco, cotton, and sugar have also been decoupled and included in the “Single Farm Payment”. 
15 Total MFN exports increase by a smaller amount (538,000 t), as some of the increase in exports to the EU are exports 
  11EU budget expenditure is well below that expected under the “No policy change” scenario, 
while tariff revenue is higher with respect to both the reference and the “Status quo” scenarios, due 
to increased imports from MFN countries. 
If EPA are assumed to be in place, the EU market equilibrium does not change significantly, 
while the distribution of imports between MFN and ACP suppliers does. MFN exports to the EU 
are forecasted to be lower than those which would occur under the same domestic policy scenario 
and no EPA by 165,000 t and ACP ones higher by 178,000 t. 
“Memorandum” 
This policy option is based on the joint proposal put forward by Cyprus, France, Portugal and Spain 
and described in the Memorandum the Ministers of Agriculture of these countries signed in Madeira 
in September 2005. 
Under this proposal the “basic” and “supplementary” aid payments were to be removed and 
replaced by different policy schemes in each country, within given financial envelopes. In the 2005 
Memorandum total budget expenditure was suggested to be the highest yearly CMO budget 
expenditure in the 2000-2004 period (i.e. 302 million €, the expenditure in 2000). In the simulations 
the budget allocations are those decided with the December 2006 reform. 
The different policy instruments applied in the different countries are modelled as follows: 
(a) in France and Spain 60% of the budget allocation is devoted to decoupled payments. In 
order to receive their full entitlement of decoupled payments, farms have to produce at least 
70% of  what they produced, on average, in the 2000-2004 period. It turns out that the 
financial incentive is large enough to ensure that farms find it profitable to produce at least 
the minimum volume of bananas needed for them to claim the entire amount of decoupled 
payments they are eligible for (decoupled payments in France and Spain are around 7,900 
and 8,800 €/ha, respectively).  In the 2005 Memorandum the remaining 40% of the envelope 
has been proposed to be devoted:  
                                                                                                                                                                  
previously directed elsewhere. 
  12(i)  to an additional 30 €/t specific (coupled) payment to open air banana producers in 
the Canary Islands and to banana producers in mountain areas in Guadalupe and 
Martinique;  
(ii)  to increase decoupled payments to banana producers; 
(iii)  to support start-up activities of new farmers and the enlargement of existing farms. 
The impact on the banana market of the use of the remaining 40% of the envelope has been 
ignored in the modelling. Financial resources used to increase decoupled payments 
uniformly will effect farm incomes, but will have no direct effect on market equilibrium. 
Those used to finance coupled payments for banana producers facing specific 
disadvantageous production conditions will increase the profitability of banana production 
under these conditions; however, the structure of the model does not allow us to simulate the 
extent of these effects. For the same reason the simulations ignore the effects of financial 
resources employed to support new farmers and the enlargement of existing farms.  
(b) in Portugal 100% of the financial allocation is devoted to the introduction of a fully coupled 
production subsidy. The fixed per unit subsidy is given by the financial allocation divided 
by the average yearly production in 2000-2004; this yields a subsidy equal to 404.3  €/t. The 
subsidy expenditure cannot exceed Portugal’s financial allocation; if production is such that 
expenditure would exceed the maximum expenditure allowed, the per unit subsidy is cut pro 
rata so that the expenditure equals the budget allocation. 
(c) in Greece and Cyprus 100% of the financial allocation goes into fully decoupled farm 
payments. 
The expected impact of this policy option is in-between those of the “Status quo” and “Full 
decoupling” scenarios.  
In France and Spain banana production equals the minimum threshold required to receive the 
full amount of decoupled payments: 234.5 and 286.3 thousand t, respectively, vs. 173 and 145 
thousand t produced when farms, under the “Full decoupling” option, are free to produce what they 
  13find profitable at market prices, and vs. 504 and 457 thousand t produced when in these two 
countries the pre-2007 policy regime is extended to 2013. In Portugal, where support is fully 
coupled, production equals 22 thousand t, while it is forecasted to equal 8 thousand t when it is 
decoupled. In Greece and Cyprus, where payments are decoupled in all three scenarios, the minor 
differences observed in the volume of bananas produced are driven by the small changes in the 
equilibrium price in the EU market.  
EU domestic production is now 567.7 thousand t and imports equal 5,420 million t. MFN and 
EBA exports are between those in the “Status quo” and “Full decoupling” scenarios, while ACP 
exports remain equal to the volume of the TRQ (the only change is for the quota rent, which now 
equals 53.3 $/t). 
In this case too the impact of the implementation of EPA shows almost entirely in the change 
in the composition of EU imports. MFN exports to the EU decline from 4,544 to 4,384 million t and 
ACP ones increase from 775,000 to 944,000 t (table 3; figure 1). 
3.  Sensitivity analyses 
As is always the case when attempts are made to model the many forces at work to forecast the 
outcome of alternative economic policy choices, the results depend, to a certain extent, on the 
information used and the assumptions made. The main issues to keep in mind when considering the 
results of a model such as the one used in this study are:  
a)  the quality of the data available; 
b)  the assumption that other actors apart from the EU – i.e. multinationals involved in banana 
production and trade, large retail agglomerations and other countries – behave 
competitively;  
c)  the assumption that bananas are a homogeneous product;  
d)  the assumption that the supply of transportation services is infinitely elastic (i.e. banana 
trading is not constrained by transportation capacity, and transportation and other transaction 
costs do not vary either as a function of the volume traded or over time); 
  14e)  the assumption that farmers in the EU make production decisions without taking into 
account expectations on possible cuts in coupled direct payments, when they are in place, as 
a result of financial stabilization mechanisms.  
The assumption that the banana market is perfectly competitive seems particularly sensitive, 
despite the fact that it has been used in all analyses of policy issues in this market so far, that there 
is no definite evidence of multinationals exerting market power, and that the sign of the impact of 
the import regime introduced by the EU on January 1 2006 on the structure of the banana market 
remains a priori ambiguous (will the elimination of quota A/B licences make the banana market 
more or less competitive?). 
Were the assumption that when farmers make their production decisions they ignore possible 
cuts of coupled direct payments not to hold, the simulations would overestimate production in all 
EU countries in the “No policy change” reference scenario, and in France, Portugal and Spain in the 
“Status quo” scenario.  
The sensitivity of the results generated by the model to the parameters used has been assessed 
with respect to those which appear potentially more critical: 
(a) the €/$ exchange rate; 
(b) the export supply elasticities in the main ACP exporters; and 
(c) the demand price elasticity in the EU-15.  
These simulations should provide the reader with a sense of “by how much” and “in which 
direction” the results presented above would change if different assumptions were made with 
respect to these parameters. 
The sensitivity analyses have been conducted only for three of the seven scenarios considered 
above: the “No policy change” reference scenario and the “Status quo” and “Full decoupling” 
policy scenarios assuming that the EPA will have been implemented by 2013. 
In the simulations presented above the €/$ exchange rate used is 1.25; two alternative values 
have been considered to test the sensitivity of the results to this parameter: 1.10 and 1.40 (table 4). 
  15Changes in the exchange rate modify the competitiveness of imports vis a vis domestic production, 
with a higher exchange rate increasing their competitiveness and a lower exchange rate, on the 
contrary, making imported bananas less competitive on the EU market. Everything else held 
constant, when the exchange rate is 1.40 imports are higher and domestic prices lower than those in 
the simulations presented in section 2; the opposite is the case when the exchange rate is set equal 
1.10. When the results presented in table 4 are compared with those presented above, the 
differences appear relatively small. For example, when the €/$ exchange rate is 1.40 EU imports 
increase by 3.2% in the reference scenario, by 3.2% in the “Status quo” scenario and by 3.5% in the 
“Full decoupling” one; when the exchange rate is set equal 1.10 EU imports decline by 4%, 4.1% 
and 4.4%, respectively.  
The sensitivity of the results obtained to the assumptions made with respect to the elasticity of 
the export supply functions in the ACP countries has been assessed by assuming those of Ivory 
Coast and Cameroon (these two countries alone account for two thirds of ACP banana exports) to 
be much less price responsive, being equal to 1 instead of 1.5 (table 5).  
This assessment is specifically relevant for the results obtained when it is assumed that EPA 
are implemented and ACP banana exports can enter the EU market duty- and quota-free. In fact, the 
change in these two parameters is irrelevant for the simulations in the “No policy change” reference 
scenario, as ACP exports to the EU remain equal to the binding constraint they face; the only 
impact is the reduction of the quota rent from 47.5 to 25.6 $/t. When the other two scenarios are 
considered, the market equilibrium in the EU is only marginally affected by the marked change in 
the price responsiveness of the excess supply functions in Cameroon and Ivory Coast, while the 
composition of EU imports by supplier, as expected, appears to be relatively sensitive to the 
assumption made with respect to these parameters; in fact, both in the “Status quo” and in the “Full 
decoupling” scenarios ACP exports are lower (-10%) and MFN exports higher (+2%) by roughly 
the same amount in absolute terms (100,000 t).  
  16Finally, the sensitivity of the results obtained to the assumption made on the price elasticity of 
the demand function in the EU-15 has been assessed by setting it equal to two extreme values, -0.2 
and -0.8, instead of -0.5 (table 6). Under such extreme assumptions regarding the price 
responsiveness of banana consumption in the EU-25, its consumption and imports change 
significantly: under all three scenarios, when the demand price elasticity is -0.8 EU consumption 
and imports are above those when it is -0.5 by 320-330 thousand t; on the contrary, when the 
demand price elasticity is -0.2 EU consumption and imports are below those when it is -0.5 by 330-
350 thousand t.    
4.  Conclusions 
Because of the impossibility at this stage of making assumptions on the specific measures France, 
Portugal and Spain will decide to implement using the resources transferred to their POSEI 
programmes, an a priori assessment of the impact of the December 2006 reform of the CMO for 
bananas is impossible. What has been done in this paper is to simulate the expected market impact 
of different feasible policy choices on their part.  
The “Status quo” scenario induces very little change, while the full decoupling of support is 
associated with the greatest impact on banana trade.  
The “Full decoupling” of support to banana producers induces a sharp reduction in banana 
production in the EU, from 1 million to 350 thousand t; while consumption in the EU is only 
slightly below that in the “Status quo” scenario, EU imports (5.626 million t) are higher by more 
than 600,000 t. With EPA in place, both MFN and ACP exporters benefit from the slightly higher 
price and increased exports; without EPA, MFN exports increase, while ACP exports remain 
constrained by the quota. The impact of the “Memorandum” policy option remains between those 
of the “Status quo” and “Full decoupling” scenarios. Production in Spain and France equals 70% of 
production in 2000-2004, as farmers find it profitable to produce the minimum required to be 
eligible for decoupled payments; EU production and imports are now 567,700  and 5,420,000 t, 
respectively.  
  17In all three scenarios, the question whether the EPA have been implemented or not in 2013 
only affects the relative share of the EU market held by MFN and ACP countries (MFN exports are 
significantly higher and ACP ones lower if EPA are not in place), while EU consumption and 
imports remain relatively stable. 
Sensitivity analyses with respect to some of the parameters of the model which are potentially 
more critical have been performed; the results of the simulations appear robust with respect to the 
assumptions made, as the changes in the simulation results appear to be not of an order of 
magnitude to modify their normative implications. 
 Available estimates of the trade impact of the introduction of the EU “tariff-only” import 
regime for bananas are much smaller than some of those presented in this paper for the reform of 
the EU domestic policy regime. Anania (2006) estimates that the introduction of the so-called 
“tariff-only” import regime on January 1 2006 will lead to an overall 9.9% increase in EU banana 
imports, while imports from MFN countries increase by 13.2% and those from ACP countries by 
3.3%; Guyomard, Le Mouël and Levert  (2006) estimate that the new import regime will increase 
EU imports by 5-6% and MFN exports to the EU by 11-13%, depending on the assumptions made. 
The simulations of the possible impact of the new EU domestic policy regime for bananas presented 
in this paper show that, ceteris paribus, if France, Portugal and Spain decide to decouple payments 
to their banana producers, EU imports will increase by 13% and MFN exports to the EU by 16%; if 
they decide for a 2005 Memorandum-like option, EU imports still increase by 9% and MFN exports 
to the EU by 11%.  
Paradoxically, while the reform of the EU import regime for bananas has attracted much 
attention and generated considerable debate, very little interest seems to have been shown so far 
outside Europe to the reform of the EU domestic policies for bananas and its implications for trade. 
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EU-15 4059,7 4193,5 588,6 -0,50 0,5
Czech Republic 99,6 103,0 495,7 -0,75 1
Slovakia 46,0 46,4 458,4 -0,80 1
Poland 232,0 233,4 446,3 -0,80 1
Hungary 101,6 75,5 391,5 -0,75 1
Other six EU new member states 60,3 60,8 549,3 -0,80 1
USA 3490,4 3411,0 272,4 -0,40 0,4
Other importers 4510,3 4433,9 375,0 -0,80 0,5
Spain 407,3 407,3 681,5 1,0
France 358,9 358,9 519,7 1,0
Portugal 21,9 21,9 584,7 1,0
Greece 2,4 2,4 719,8 1,0
Cyprus 10,5 13,3 257,5 1,0
Ivory Coast 256,0 247,5 289,1 1,5 0,5
Cameroon 238,4 231,1 217,1 1,5 0,5
Dominican Republic, Belize and Suriname 179,2 171,7 404,5 1,0 0,5
Jamaica, Windward Islands and other ACP 
non-EBA countries
156,2 97,0 455,1 1,0 0,5
ACP EBA exporters 2,6 2,6 205,1 1,5 0,5
Ecuador 4199,2 4318,8 223,0 1,3 0,5
Colombia 1418,1 1347,8 283,7 1,3 0,5
Costa Rica 1873,2 1863,2 264,3 1,0 0,5
Panama 403,9 399,4 270,9 1,0 0,5
Honduras 437,2 441,2 246,4 1,5 0,5
Brazil 241 266,9 156,1 1,0 0,5
Guatemala 974,0 981,8 221,7 1,5 0,5
Other MFN exporters 1327,9 1338,5 186,4 1,0 0,5
EBA non-ACP exporters 47,1 46,1 190,6 1,5 0,5
1:  For EU-15 apparent consumption (imports + domestic production - exports). 
2:  For Spain, France, Portugal and Greece farm gate prices, including basic aid; for Cyprus farm gate price.    21













Ivory Coast 2,7 -3,28 2,38 2,7 -3 2,38
Cameroon 2,5 -2,6 -8,28 2,5 -2,6 0
Dominican Republic, Belize and 
Suriname
1,6 4,34 0,36 1,6 4,34 0,36
Jamaica, Windward Islands and 
other ACP non-EBA countries
2 -0,25 -1,17 2 -0,25 0
ACP EBA exporters 2,5 0,37 -0,24 0 0 0








unadjusted per cent yearly 
increase in  
adjusted* per cent yearly 
increase in  
Colombia 1,8 -6,54 0,02 1,8 -3 0,02
Costa Rica 2,1 13,75 0,26 2,1 7 0,26
Panama 1,7 4,62 -0,51 1,7 4,62 0
Honduras 2,8 6,83 -8,84 2,8 6,83 0
azil 1,4 -11,57 0,45 1,4 -3 0,45
Guatemala 2,6 2,11 8,03 2,6 2,11 5
Other MFN exporters 1,7 1,04 1,77 1,7 1,04 1,77
EBA non-ACP exporters 2 5,11 -2,12 0 0 0
15 0,3 2,08 0,3 2,08
ech Republic -0,1 0,97 -0,1 0,97
ovakia 0,1 1,08 0,1 1,08
and 0 4,35 0 4,35
Hungary -0,2 2,93 -0,2 2,93
Other six EU new member states -0,5 3,54 5,49 -0,5 3,54 5
USA 1,2 5,04 3,17 1,2 5,04 3,17
Other importers 1,1 0,44 3,44 1,1 0,44 3,44
per cent yearly yield changes above 5% replaced by 5%, below 0% by 0%; per cent yearly per capita income changes above 7% 
eplaced by 7%, below -3% by -3% .  ACP and non-ACP EBA countries per capita income and population per cent yearly changes have 
been set equal to zero in order to make them more responsive to the structural change associated with the preferential treatment due 






EU-25 production (000 t) 1,034 1,006.1 567.7 350.7 1,006.7 567.7 346.7
     Spain 457 457 286 145 457 286 144
     France 504 504 235 173 504 235 171
     Portugal 22 22 22 8 22 22 7
     Greece 2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
     Cyprus 49 23 24 24 23 24 24
EU-25 imports (000 t) 4,976 5,002 5,420 5,626 5,010 5,428 5,638
     from MFN countries 4,103 4,129 4,544 4,749 3,985 4,384 4,584
     from ACP countries 775 775 775 775 927 944 953
     from EBA countries 98 98 101 102 98 100 101
USA imports (000 t) 4,893 4,890 4,851 4,831 4,904 4,866 4,847
Rest of the world net imports (000 t) 2,373 2,371 2,342 2,327 2,381 2,353 2,339
MFN countries, total exports 11,369 11,390 11,735 11,907 11,271 11,603 11,769
EU-25 border (cif) price (€/t) 465.0 465.2 469.6 471.8 463.7 467.9 470.0
EU-25 consumption (000 t) 6,010 6,008 5,987 5,976 6,016 5,995 5,985
EU-25 budget expenditure (mill €) 373.3  
(1) 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4
Basic aid (€/t) 419.8
Production subsidy in Spain (€/t)  
(2) 308.8 308.8
Production subsidy in France (€/t)  
(2) 256.3 256.3
Production subsidy in Portugal (€/t)  
(2) 392.7 387 392.7 388
EU-25 tariff revenue (mill €) 722.1 726.7 799.7 835.9 701.4 771.5 806.7
(1) includes supplementary aid budget expenditure computed using the "standard formula".  
(2) after reduction, if any, as a result of the financial stabilizer.
No policy 
change
Table 3  -  Simulation results (2013).
without EPA with EPA
  22 1 € = 1.25 $ 1 € = 1.10 $ 1 € = 1.40 $ 1 € = 1.25 $ 1 € = 1.10 $ 1 € = 1.40 $ 1 € = 1.25 $ 1 € = 1.10 $ 1 € = 1.40 $
EU-25 production (000 t) 1,034 1,037 1,032 1,006.7 1,009.8 1,004.6 346.7 393.8 309.6
     Spain 457 457 457 457 457 457 144 163 128
     France 504 504 504 504 504 504 171 195 153
     Portugal 22 22 22 22 22 22 7 8 7
     Greece 2 2 2 0.7 0,8 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6
     Cyprus 49 52 47 23 26 21 24 27 21
EU-25 imports (000 t) 4,976 4,776 5,135 5,010 4,805 5,172 5,638 5,388 5,837
     from MFN countries 4,103 3,914 4,251 3,985 3,883 4,047 4,584 4,439 4,680
     from ACP countries 775 775 775 927 835 1,017 953 859 1,045
     from EBA countries 98 87 109 98 87 108 101 90 112
USA imports (000 t) 4,893 4,911 4,879 4,904 4,914 4,898 4,847 4,861 4,838
Rest of the world net imports (000 t) 2,373 2,386 2,362 2,381 2,389 2,377 2,339 2,349 2,332
MFN countries, total exports 11,369 11,212 11,492 11,271 11,186 11,322 11,769 11,648 11,850
EU-25 border (cif) price (€/t) 465.0 502.1 435.4 463.7 501.7 433.5 470.0 508.4 439.4
EU-25 consumption (000 t) 6,010 5,814 6,167 6,016 5,815 6,176 5,985 5,782 6,146
EU-25 budget expenditure (mill €) 373.3 
(1) 341.6 398.2 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4
EU-25 tariff revenue (mill €) 722.1 688.9 748.1 701.4 683.5 712.3 806.7 781.2 823.8
(1) includes supplementary aid budget expenditure computed using the "standard formula".  
Table 4  - Sensitivity analysis, €/$ exchange rate (2013).
Status quo, with EPA Full decoupling, with EPA No policy change
  23 η = 1.5 η = 1 η = 1.5 η = 1 η = 1.5 η = 1
EU-25 production (000 t) 1,034 1,034 1,006.7 1,006.7 346.7 349.7
     Spain 457 457 457 457 144 145
     France 504 504 504 504 171 172
     Portugal 22 22 22 22 7 8
     Greece 2 2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
     Cyprus 49 49 23 23 24 24
EU-25 imports (000 t) 4,976 4,976 5,010 5,005 5,638 5,630
     from MFN countries 4,103 4,103 3,985 4,074 4,584 4,678
     from ACP countries 775 775 927 833 953 851
     from EBA countries 98 98 98 98 101 101
USA imports (000 t) 4,893 4,893 4,904 4,896 4,847 4,838
Rest of the world net imports (000 t) 2,373 2,373 2,381 2,375 2,339 2,332
MFN countries, total exports 11,369 11,369 11,271 11,345 11,769 11,848
EU-25 border (cif) price (€/t) 465.0 465.0 463.7 464.7 470.0 471.0
EU-25 consumption (000 t) 6,010 6,010 6,016 6,012 5,985 5,980
EU-25 budget expenditure (mill €) 373.3   
(1) 373.3 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4
EU-25 tariff revenue (mill €) 722.1 722.1 701.4 717.0 806.7 823.4
(1) includes supplementary aid budget expenditure computed using the "standard formula".  
Table 5  - Sensitivity analysis,  price elasticity of the export supply functions in Cameroon and Ivory Coast (2013).
No policy change Status quo, with EPA Full decoupling, with EPA
  24 η = - 0.5 η = - 0.2 η = - 0.8 η = - 0.5 η = - 0.2 η = - 0.8 η = - 0.5 η = - 0.2 η = - 0.8
EU-25 production (000 t) 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,006.7 1,006.7 1,006.7 346.7 340.7 352.7
     Spain 457 457 457 457 457 457 144 142 146
     France 504 504 504 504 504 504 171 168 174
     Portugal 22 22 22 22 22 22 7 7 8
     Greece 2 2 2 0.7 0,7 0,7 0.7 0.7 0.7
     Cyprus 49 49 49 23 23 23 24 23 24
EU-25 imports (000 t) 4,976 4,630 5,308 5,010 4,661 5,345 5,638 5,306 5,954
     from MFN countries 4,103 3,758 4,433 3,985 3,652 4,305 4,584 4,268 4,886
     from ACP countries 775 775 775 927 913 941 953 939 966
     from EBA countries 98 97 100 98 96 99 101 99 102
USA imports (000 t) 4,893 4,926 4,861 4,904 4,936 4,874 4,847 4,877 4,818
Rest of the world net imports (000 t) 2,373 2,397 2,349 2,381 2,405 2,359 2,339 2,361 2,317
MFN countries, total exports 11,369 11,081 11,643 11,271 10,993 11,537 11,769 11,506 12,021
EU-25 border (cif) price (€/t) 465.0 461.3 468.4 463.7 460.2 467.1 470.0 466.7 473.2
EU-25 consumption (000 t) 6,010 5,663 6,342 6,016 5,666 6,352 5,985 5,649 6,307
EU-25 budget expenditure (mill €) 373.3  
(1) 376.4 370.3 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4 283.4
EU-25 tariff revenue (mill €) 722.1 661.4 780.2 701.4 642.7 757.6 806.7 751.2 859.9
(1) includes supplementary aid budget expenditure computed using the "standard formula".  
Table 6  - Sensitivity analysis,  price elasticity of the EU-15 domestic demand function (2013).
No policy change Status quo, with EPA Full decoupling, with EPA
 
 
  25 Figure 1 -  The impact of the reform of the EU CMO for bananas on its imports from 
  MFN, ACP and EBA countries (million t, 2013) 











ACP 0,775 0,775 0,775 0,775 0,927 0,944 0,953
MFN 4,103 4,129 4,544 4,749 3,985 4,384 4,584
EBA 0,098 0,098 0,101 0,102 0,098 0,1 0,101
Legenda:  NPC: No policy change;  SQ: Status quo;  MEM: Memorandum;  FD: Full decoupling.
Without EPA With EPA
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